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Abstract     
In the midst of turmoil, regulation is “a rule or directive made and maintained by an 
authority” to maintain order. More often than not, the authoritative figure that imposes and 
upholds regulatory standards, following its introduction to the specific industry or firm, is the 
government of the respective country or region. However, politicians, like the rest of us, are 
unable to predict when a crisis will occur and what appropriate regulation should be imposed to 
prevent that crisis. Thus, an inevitable concern with regulation is the fact that it is unable to 
thwart an unforeseeable future crisis but is instead a preventative measure in response to a 
previous event. As is the case with crises before and after the Financial Crisis of 2008, the 
imposition of new laws like Dodd-Frank and others were enacted following the destructive 
effects of each crisis. Unfortunately, financial crises are seemingly inevitable, as people are 
ultimately self-interested and continue to find loopholes in the laws of the financial system to 
create incredible profits by unlawful means. Currently the Foreign Exchange Market is facing 
this very issue in its own crisis as people within the industry are consistently taking advantage of 
a lack of regulatory infrastructure to make money. What regulations will be imposed remains to 
be seen. In this paper I will compare the factors that caused each respective crisis and determine 
what can be learned from the financial crisis and its resulting regulations that applies to the 
Foreign Exchange Market crisis.  
The 2008 Financial Crisis 
When economies are doing well there are powerful political pressures not to rock the 
boat. As an unintended consequence of these political pressures, regulatory bodies scale back on 
their activities. More often than not, the inactivity, or lack of existence, of proper regulatory 
bodies during periods of economic success has lead to the forces driving prosperity to go 
unchecked. As a result of this unchecked economic growth, people take advantage of the good 
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times and grow their wealth by any means. Unfortunately, this mindset further influences some 
people to attempt to acquire wealth through improper, and more often than not illegal, activities. 
This was certainly the case with the 2008 financial crisis. This crisis is considered by many 
economists to have been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It 
threatened the collapse of large financial institutions, which was prevented by government-
funded bailouts, but was unable to prevent stock markets from dropping worldwide. As a result 
major financial regulations were imposed to prevent another financial crisis. Before I analyze the 
regulation that resulted from this crisis, it is essential to know how it all happened.  In the midst 
of a booming housing market and strong economic conditions, the crisis brought two groups of 
people together; homeowners and investors. This union of homeowners – represented by their 
mortgages on houses – and investors – represented by the money from large institutions such as 
pension funds and insurance companies, became the underlying impetus of the crisis. 
Unfortunately, brokers and bankers on Wall Street orchestrated the combination of these 
normally separate, and seemingly disconnected markets to create immense wealth for 
themselves. In the process, they built their foundation for wealth creation on faulty premises that 
were bound to fail. On 15 September 2008 the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the 158-year old 
investment bank, became the largest bankruptcy in US history. This event cued the beginning of 
the Global Financial Crisis. 
In order to fully comprehend how the combination of homeowners and investors created 
the financial time bomb that paralyzed the global financial system, one must go back a few years 
before the crisis. In the wake of the “dot.com” bust of 2000 and September 11, 2001, Federal 
Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, lowered interest rates to a mere 1% to keep the economy 
growing. Traditionally investors seeking secure investments went to the Federal Reserve to 
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invest in very secure treasury bills, however by most investment standards, a 1% return is pitiful. 
As a result those investors who had invested in treasury bills started to look elsewhere for higher 
returns. In sharp contrast, banks on Wall Street were ecstatic that interest rates were lower as 
they could now borrow from the Fed at abnormally low rates. When these low interest rates were 
combined with “the general surpluses from Japan, China and the Middle East there [was] an 
abundance of cheap credit” (Done). Subsequently banks could borrow money at incredibly cheap 
rates and take full advantage of “leverage.” Leverage is “the act of using borrowed money to buy 
an investment or a company.” More simply put, leverage is borrowing money to amplify the 
overall profits from a deal. Given a safe market environment to borrow, leverage transforms 
good deals into great deals in exchange for the cost of borrowing. Since interest rates were so 
low, this key method of generating profits for banks was amplified, and as a result institutions on 
Wall Street (such as JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill 
Lynch and Lehman Brothers) became highly leveraged. Wall Street institutions naturally then 
borrowed large amounts of money, made great deals, grew tremendously rich and subsequently 
paid the borrowed money back. Investors took note of this and wanted a piece of the action, 
rousing Wall Street to find a way to meet investor demands. Wall street obliged by connecting 
these investors to homeowners through mortgages.  
As I mentioned earlier, the underlying cause of the crisis was this meeting of investors 
and homeowners, but one may ask why that is the case? It is important to note that becoming a 
homeowner during this period was fantastic, as housing prices had been consistently rising, 
seemingly forever, and increasing numbers of families were looking for homes. With ever-higher 
house prices, increasing numbers of families wanted to get onto the housing ladder and contacted 
a mortgage broker – who connected them to a lender eager to put his (borrowed) money to work. 
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The family bought their dream house; the broker made a good commission, and the lender 
obtained a revenue stream from the monthly mortgage payments. This cycle repeated itself every 
time an individual decided to purchase a home and everyone involved was happy. Investors 
assumed that housing prices would never drop, and saw what appeared to be an opportunity for 
arbitrage that made better returns than treasury bills. Suddenly investment bankers started to 
borrow millions of dollars in order to leverage thousands of mortgages from lenders. The now 
seemingly disconnected homeowners and investors were brought together, as investment bankers 
combined the purchased mortgages into asset-backed securities to be sold for their respective 
fees. Every month, through the securitization of these mortgages, the investment banker received 
monthly mortgage payments, very similar to Treasury bill coupon payments, making them very 
wealthy, which in itself is a good business. However, since there was no regulation at the time to 
prevent banks from taking further unlawful measures to expand their profits, they did. The 
bankers then repackaged the asset-backed securities and their respective revenue streams into 
further structured investment vehicles in the form of three separate types of mortgage debt, 
“safe,” “okay “and “risky,” more commonly known as a Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). 
CDO’s essentially worked like three cascading trays. As money came in from homeowners 
paying off their mortgages, the top tray would fill to the brim and spill over until eventually the 
bottom tray filled up. Since CDO’s offered differing levels of risk, they offered different returns, 
much like most forms of bonds. Thus, the riskier the CDO, the higher the yield it offered. 
Additionally, in an attempt to make the top tray even safer, banks insured them for a small fee, 
called a Credit Default Swap. Credit Default Swaps became crucial as “investors bought the 
safer tranches because they trusted the triple-A credit ratings assigned by agencies such as 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s“ (The Economist). While the banks bought the safer CDO’s and 
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insured themselves with a credit default swap, the flaky mortgage-loan CDOs were bought by 
more risk-tolerant investors such as hedge funds. The investment banker made millions from 
selling these CDOs and immediately repaid any outstanding loans. However should 
homeowners’ default on their mortgages, less money would come in, increasing the likelihood of 
the bottom tray not becoming full. Unfortunately, investors and homeowners disregarded the risk 
of default because they assumed that housing prices would never go down. The result of a 
default on a house mortgage was the foreclosure of the home, which the owner of the CDO 
claimed as their property. This home was easily resold, given the high levels of demand for 
homes in the housing market, and effectively starting the entire process of creating CDO’s all 
over again.  
Finally investors found a good investment for their money, much better than the 1% 
treasury bills. As housing prices continued to soar, investors were so pleased that they wanted 
more CDOs. The investment banker went back to the lender to buy more home mortgages, and 
the lender went to the mortgage broker to gather more mortgages to sell, “but everyone 
qualifying for a standard mortgage already had one – so, in combination, the lender and broker 
came up with an idea to squeeze things a bit further” (Done). This disastrous idea was to add 
more risk to new mortgages. Instead of selling to responsible homeowners (prime mortgages), 
brokers and lenders started providing mortgages to the somewhat less responsible. This idea was 
rationalized because in the end if homeowners defaulted the lender would get to keep the house, 
and if housing prices are perpetually increasing, the lender could sell the house for profit. Thus 
the infamous subprime mortgage was born, with no down payment or proof of income necessary.  
Just as before the mortgage broker connected the family with the lender and a mortgage, 
made his commission, and the family with limited and unstable income bought a home. The 
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lender would then sell the mortgage to the investment banker, who turned it into a CDO and sold 
the increasingly risky slices to investors and others. This worked quite nicely for everyone 
involved making the seller of the CDO extremely wealthy. No one was worried because as soon 
as they sold the mortgage to the next guy it was his problem. If the homeowner was projected to 
default, they didn’t care so long as they were selling off their risk to the next guy and making 
millions. Essentially investors were playing hot potato with a financial time bomb. Not 
surprisingly, the less-stable homeowners defaulted on their mortgages, and banks started to 
foreclose on the owners. This meant, as I explained earlier, thousands of CDOs transformed into 
homes. No big deal, the bank would put it up for sale, but as more and more of the monthly 
payments turned into homes, the supply of homes spiked. Unfortunately for the new owners of 
thousands of homes, the rapid increase in supply was met with very low levels of demand, as 
anyone who was qualified or unqualified already had a home. What started with subprime 
individuals unable to pay back their mortgages worked its way up the chain to highly leveraged 
institutions across the board unable to pay their mountainous debts of millions of dollars. Since 
no one would buy any of the previously highly desirable CDOs, as investors already owned 
thousands of CDOs, home prices dropped causing institutions to go bankrupt.  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers effectively caused the whole financial system to freeze 
as a result of major firms going bankrupt. Regrettably, “when house prices declined, the equity 
of those homeowners was quickly wiped out; in turn, "underwater" borrowers who owed more 
than their houses were worth were much more likely to default on their mortgage payments” 
(Bernanke). Thus as house prices started rapidly declining, “anyone still paying their mortgage 
of $250,000 was strongly incentivized to default too when all their neighbors’ houses were now 
valued below $100,000” (Done). Suddenly the infallible assumption that housing prices could 
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never decline was proved wrong as default rates swept through the US and house prices 
plummeted. The fear of financial oblivion was real and imminent and the Great Recession began.  
Following the massive losses caused by the financial crisis, policy-makers sought to 
rectify the damage done to financial systems and economies by enacting a large set of financial 
reforms, both at the international and domestic level. The catastrophic levels of damage done to 
the system were simply too extensive for a simple solution as “the first series of actions, 
including broad-based guarantees of bank accounts, money market funds and liquidity by the 
Federal Reserve, were not enough” (Reyes). The Bush Administration was forced to go to 
extreme measures in order to address a rapidly deteriorating situation. On October 3, 2008, 
“congress passed and President Bush signed into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (Public Law 110-343), which established the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP)” (St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank). Although TARP was eventually signed into 
law, the immediate reaction was poor. Subsequently the initial rejection of TARP on 30 
September 2008 resulted in the largest one-day drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 778 
points, or $1.3 trillion in market value. Not ten days after TARP was signed into law the 
Treasury, Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC announced the launches of the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP) and the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). It was announced that 
CPP, under TARP, was designed to provide new capital to banks, which allowed them to loan 
more money to businesses and thus stimulate the economy. Under the program, the U.S. 
Treasury bailed out 707 qualifying U.S. banks and savings institutions when they purchased 
$205 billion of senior preferred shares. TLGP, on the other hand, was established to “temporarily 
guarantee – for a fee – the senior debt of all FDIC insured institutions and their holding 
companies, as well as deposits in non-interest bearing deposit transaction accounts” (The 
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Treasury). This was conceived to avert the two most immediate threats to the U.S. financial 
system, a drop in public confidence in the integrity of their depositary institutions and the 
disintegration of the interbank and short-term credit markets. Emergency measures such as 
TARP, CPP and TLGP were conceived in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in order to 
stabilize the economy. These short-term measures, although effective in their implementation, 
were not meant as permanent solutions to the Great Recession. In the wake of 8.8 million lost 
jobs and $19.2 trillion lost in household wealth, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 and the reactionary measures that followed, were merely the beginning parts of addressing 
the new global recession. The global impact of the crisis encouraged policy makers to reevaluate 
how to best oversee and organize money and finance, both in the domestic and international 
realms. The most profound measure that arose from the crisis was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, more commonly referred to as Dodd-Frank.  
Dodd-Frank marks the greatest legislative change to US financial regulation since the 
inception of financial legislation in the 1930s, which resulted in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, to name only the most important. The Obama 
Administration passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 to prevent the recurrence of events that caused the 
2008 financial crisis with the aim “to promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes” (United States Securities and Exchange Commission). 
The act is categorized into sixteen titles and drastically changes the existing regulatory structure 
of the financial services industry through a variety of measures, such as creating a myriad of new 
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agencies (while merging and removing others) in an effort to streamline the regulatory process, 
increase oversight of specific institutions, promote transparency, and numerous additional 
changes. This legislation in many ways represents a change in the way America’s financial 
markets will operate in the future. Although the act is a well-intentioned attempt to fix what went 
wrong in the years leading up to 2008, the problem with Dodd-Frank is that it consists of 1,000 
pages of legislative guidelines, all of which need interpretation. The act is one of the lengthiest 
and most in depth pieces of legislation to be put into law. Due to the incredible complexity of the 
act I am going to focus on a few key points that can potentially be modified and applied to the 
recent foreign exchange scandal.  
In retrospect, the financial crisis revealed a series of flaws within the financial system and 
Dodd-Frank is the attempt by which to correct and prevent those flaws from recurring. Some of 
these flaws were addressed by requiring that new financial bodies be formed to provide the 
rigorous standards and supervision needed to protect the economy, whereas others simply 
necessitated a series of requirements to meet regulatory demands.  
A few of the new agencies that were created by Dodd-Frank include the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) and the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection. These new agencies are either granted explicit power over a 
particular aspect of financial regulation, or that power is transferred from an existing agency. All 
of the new agencies are also obligated to report to Congress on an annual (or biannual) basis, to 
present the results of current plans and to explain future goals. One of the main goals of Dodd-
Frank is to subject banks to a number of regulations along with the possibility of being broken up 
if any of them are determined to be “too big to fail.” The FSOC council of 15 members is 
“charged with the goal of identifying risks to US financial stability that could arise from the 
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material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding 
companies or non-bank financial companies, or risks that could arise outside the financial 
services marketplace” (Guynn). If any of the banks gets too big in the council's determination, 
they could be regulated by the Federal Reserve, which can ask a bank to increase its reserve 
requirement – the money it has 'saved up' and is not using for lending or business costs. 
Accordingly the regulations imposed by the FSOC are intended to prevent bank insolvency. 
Before the financial crisis and Dodd-Frank, when a bank became insolvent, the Government 
would let natural economic forces take course and the bank would fail regardless of its 
importance. Under Dodd-Frank, banks are now required to have plans for a quick and orderly 
shutdown in the event that the bank becomes insolvent. These plans for shutdown are organized 
under provisions from OLA. This legislation “authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation to pursue an agency-administered wind down for certain troubled financial firms” 
(Pellerin). This way, should a major financial institution find itself in trouble in the future the 
FDIC would step in and impose appropriate regulatory requirements in order to prevent the 
disastrous effects that the collapse of Lehman Brothers had in initiating the great recession. Both 
the FSOC and OLA are legislations that essentially protect banks from having their own toxic 
activities create another crisis, but unfortunately, neither is responsible for protecting consumers 
from unlawful business practices by banks. These are the duties of the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection. The Bureau works with regulators in large banks to stop transactions that 
hurt customers, such as risky lending. In doing so consumers are given access to information 
about mortgages and credit scores in plain and simple English. These measures to increase 
transparency, in what are traditionally complicated documents, finally allows consumers the 
opportunity to understand the documents they sign. Effectively the Bureau will prevent predatory 
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loans from being created and prevent consumers from taking out that have a high probability of 
default or foreclosure. In an effort to increase constructive communication, the bureau allows for 
consumers to report issues with financial services via their website or a 24-hour hotline. These 
reports can be reflective of any issue with financial services whether it is in practice or through 
legislation, such as questions regarding the Volcker Rule. This rule prohibits banks from owning, 
investing, or sponsoring hedge funds, private equity funds, or any proprietary trading operations 
for their own profit. Basically through this law, banks are to distinguish between which profits 
and funds are for customers and for the bank itself. Although the law generally prevents trading, 
the Volcker Rule does “allow some trading when it's necessary for the bank to run its business. 
For example, banks can engage in currency trading to offset their own holdings in a foreign 
currency” (Koba). The type of trading allowed under the Volcker Rule also includes the trading 
of derivative securities. Under Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the riskiest derivatives – like credit 
default swaps – are required to be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In an effort to make them more transparent, Dodd-
Frank attempted to establish a central exchange or clearinghouse so that derivative trades can be 
made in the public. Unfortunately, “the U.S. Treasury Department exempted foreign-exchange 
swaps and forwards from Dodd-Frank Act regulations intended to reduce risk and increase 
transparency in the derivatives market” (Brush). This exemption to the foreign exchange market 
highlighted a loophole within Dodd-Frank that traders could exploit. Before I describe why I 
believe the exemption is a key piece of legislation that should be implemented by the foreign 
exchange market to prevent a scandal, it is crucial to understand the nature of derivative 
securities. 
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Derivative securities are essentially contracts between buyers and sellers. There are many 
different types of derivatives and three of the more common types of derivatives are futures, 
forwards, and swaps. Futures are derivatives contracts used so commonly that they are 
standardized financial instruments, a feature that allows them to trade on exchanges, much like 
stocks. Forwards, on the other hand, are generally specialized contracts between two financial 
firms or between a financial firm and its customer. Multinational enterprises regularly enter into 
forward contracts to hedge against losing money on future changes in exchange rates. Swaps are 
similar to forward contracts but they require counterparties to make a series of future payments, 
whereas forward contracts require only one future payment. Swap contracts can, therefore, be 
viewed as a series of forward contracts. The most commonly used swaps are those that hedge 
against interest rate risk, but market participants use many different types of swap contracts. 
Historically, most swaps have been negotiated directly between large banks and other 
institutional investors—such as insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds—on the 
over-the-counter market rather than purchased on exchanges. The exemption of the foreign 
exchange market to the stipulations of Title VII in Dodd-Frank is another hole in the system. We 
do need controls to close the gaps that allowed the financial system to fall apart, which is the 
reason Dodd-Frank was implemented. The success of Dodd-Frank rests simply on whether or not 
it makes another crisis significantly less likely. Certainly this remains to be seen. Fortunately, 
unregulated portions of the financial system have the opportunity to thwart a potential crisis 
through the modification and application of certain aspects of Dodd-Frank to tie up some of their 
own loose ends. Through the implementation of proper financial reporting and the presence of a 
central exchange system the foreign exchange market may be able to avert future scandals 
similar to the current one. 
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The Foreign Exchange Scandal 
Sadly, the processes that have led to previous crises and subsequent regulations, like that 
of the 2008 financial crisis and Dodd-Frank, were not isolated instances. Crises are growing 
increasingly inevitable, as people are ultimately self-interested and will continue to find 
loopholes in the laws of the financial system to create incredible profits by unlawful means. The 
Foreign Exchange Market (FOREX) is currently in the midst of its own scandal as people within 
the industry have consistently taken advantage of the lack of regulatory infrastructure. 
Unbeknownst to those outside of the finance industry, FOREX is the largest, most liquid market 
in the world with nearly 180 different types of currencies and about $5.3 trillion changing hands 
every day, which is 30 times greater than that of the stock market. But despite its huge size, this 
is a market that is far from extensively regulated and that has no single global body to police the 
massive 24/7 FOREX market and “for retail FX traders, the biggest risk of non-regulation is that 
of illegal activity or outright fraud” (Aitken). The market is decentralized and operates with no 
central exchange or clearing house. Consequently in order to regulate the market there are 
several governmental and independent supervisory bodies around the world, such as the National 
Futures Association, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority. In fact since no one government 
agency is responsible for policing the currency market, but rather “leaving it up to committees, 
some run by the banks themselves, to set guidelines” the regulatory void has produced another 
round of criminal accusations and multi-billion dollar penalties (Corkery).  
In the relatively short period of time following the financial crisis it is appalling that the 
firms that have been swept up in the investigations of the FOREX scandal are not relatively 
unknown firms. Firms like HSBC, Citigroup, UBS, Barclays and other big banks have been 
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accused of collusion and manipulation of foreign exchange rates. Although most have already 
announced settlements with the Department of Justice, accruing penalties large enough to wipe 
out nearly all the revenue that major investment banks generated from their foreign exchange 
businesses last year, how they pulled off the scandal is what is most concerning. In order to fully 
comprehend how the FOREX scandal took place one must understand how foreign exchange 
traders make money. For the most part, currency pairs are quoted to four decimals, with the 
smallest fraction known as a “pip.” A Euro to U.S. Dollar pair might be quoted, for example, at 
1.2567/1.2570 – a three-pip spread. The lower "bid" price is the offering price if anyone wished 
to "sell" the pair, and conversely the higher "ask" price is the price at which a trader can "buy" 
the pair, meaning the trader is speculating on a rise in the euro against the dollar. The larger the 
price spread, the more the pair has to move in the desired direction for the trader to make a 
profit. Since traders buy or sell currency pairs without broker commissions; the pip spread 
represents the broker's profit margin. Although a pip spread seems to be marginal at best, it is 
important to note that a standard currency position involves 100,000 units of currency. Thus with 
larger quantities of currency a difference of as few as 35 pips can mean significant profits. The 
pip spread leading to profit is best represented by an actual example from the scandal, as “the 
sterling/dollar exchange rate fix fell from £1.6044 to £1.6009, HSBC made a $162,000 profit” 
(Chrispin). How banks managed to manipulate the foreign exchange market, like bankers did 
with mortgages during the crisis, was done during a period of time called “the fix.” 
As I mentioned earlier, the FOREX market is open 24/7 allowing for trade to occur 
around the world uninterrupted. However, at 4pm in London all trading stops for a 60-second 
window and this period of time is called the fix. The fix establishes benchmarks at supposedly 
fair prices and is the closest thing the FOREX market has to a closing bell. For many customers 
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around the world having that daily value is key because the fix is a time of day when banks 
guarantee investors a certain rate for their currency trade. A trader’s job is to try and get an extra 
slice of each trade he makes for a client. Normally, trades are done immediately, but with the fix, 
the trader knows they have to buy a certain sum in half an hour as investors place their orders 
with a bank in advance. They see that obligation to buy as their risk for the bank that they need 
to hedge. However, at the fix, investors are guaranteed the mid rate – between the bid and ask 
price – of whatever the currency trades at in the one-minute window around the time of the fix. 
Consequently traders want to buy at a lower rate than the mid price of the fix to make their 
profit. Accordingly they want to try and work out where the market is likely to trade at 4pm. If 
they think the price of the euro might be lower at 4pm, for example, they might try to sell some 
in advance. Many investors like to use the fix because it removes any need to try and time the 
market that day.  
Ironically, the fix appeared to have been fixed by traders in London, who had been 
rigging it to their advantage. The banks and traders alike managed to collude and manipulate 
prices through private chat rooms with suitable names like “the cartel,” “the mafia” and “the 
bandits club.” As one trader at Barclays wrote in an online chat room where prosecutors say the 
price-fixing scheme was conceived “If you aint cheating, you aint trying” (Corkery). To get an 
edge, traders at the banks and institutions involved colluded to pad their returns from at earliest 
at least 2007 and 2013. To carry out the scheme, one trader would typically build a huge position 
in a currency, and then unload it at a crucial moment, hoping to move prices. “Banging the 
close,” as the process of manipulating the currency at the very last second of the fix came to be 
called, was where traders made their money. Through these chat rooms the traders would 
communicate in order to push the value of currencies lower or higher in order to bang the close 
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and make large amounts of profit. Traders at the other banks would play along, coordinate their 
actions in online chat rooms, set rates at artificial levels and earn their profits, which ultimately 
came directly out of investors’ pockets. Afterwards, traders congratulated themselves, saying 
“'Loved that mate... worked lovely... pity we couldn't get it below the 00", "there you go.. go 
early, move it, hold it, push it", "nice works gents..I don my hat" and "Hooray nice teamwork" 
(Chrispin). Without the presence of a single regulatory body overseeing the activities of the 
colluders “the trading of foreign currencies promised substantial revenues and relatively low 
risk” (Corkery). The activity was to be low risk trading In the end, five of the world’s largest 
banks involved in the scandal agreed to plead guilty to U.S. criminal charges over manipulation 
of foreign exchange rates agreeing to pay roughly $5.7 billion in penalties. While the balance 
sheets of the biggest FOREX players will be able to easily absorb these fines, the damage 
inflicted by these scandals on investors’ confidence in fair and transparent markets may be 
longer lasting. 
The rate manipulation scandal highlights the fact that despite its size and importance, the 
FOREX market remains the least regulated and most opaque of all financial markets. It also calls 
into question the wisdom of allowing rates that influence the value of trillions of dollars of assets 
and investments to be set by similar groups of a few individuals, for example, “one corner of 
foreign exchange – the $2tn spot market – is controlled by a group of fewer than 100 individual 
traders at a handful of large banks” (Schäfer). Although traders insist there are rules, many of the 
finer points are vague allowing the FOREX market to be run by a small group of global traders. 
Whether its mortgages, currencies or interest rates, whenever one small group can set the prices 
for everyone odds are they will try to turn it to their advantage and unintentionally start the chain 
reaction to the next financial crisis. 
	 17	
Suggestions  
As a result of a lack for oversight over the financial sector pre-2008 and currently with 
the foreign exchange market, gross manipulation occurred in places where manipulation should 
not have been allowed to occur. Brokers and lenders allowed for highly risky subprime loans to 
be granted to people who weren’t very risk averse, and FOREX traders rigged the fix to make 
unjustified profits. The results of both actions have been on one hand a major financial crisis, and 
on the other hand $5.7 billion in fines. Consequently new regulations have to be imposed to 
prevent crises from recurring. Fortunately regulations of different markets can be modified to 
prevent illegal acts from occurring. Dodd-Frank is meant to protect consumers from risky 
behavior, abuse, or financial loss of financial institutions by making the financial system more 
transparent and accountable. Ironically it was the exemption of portions of Dodd-Frank that 
allowed for the FOREX market to remain unregulated. Through Title VII of Dodd-Frank the 
FOREX market was to be regulated through a central exchange and as a result FOREX would 
have been forced to implement the same stringent regulations that the rest of the financial sector 
was set to follow. However, on November 2012, the U.S. Treasury Secretary issued a final 
determination that exempted both FOREX swaps and FOREX forwards from the majority of the 
Dodd-Frank requirements for swaps. According to former Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, 
the foreign-exchange market needed no special regulation sighting “an elaborate framework in 
place already to limit settlement risk" (Kuttner). Essentially an assertion that the FOREX market 
was sufficiently regulated, a statement proved incorrect by the manipulation of the FOREX 
market. This assumption is unfortunately the same sort of belief mortgage lenders made before 
the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting imposition of Dodd-Frank.  
Dodd-Frank, under Title VII, basically requires all derivatives to be traded on regulated 
exchanges or central clearing facilities, where they are subject to prohibitions against market 
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manipulation and where regulators have enough data to detect patterns of abuse. Exchange 
trading and central clearing also ensures that traders have enough capital to cover the trade if a 
deal goes bad. By requiring the majority of derivatives to be traded on exchanges, Dodd-Frank 
also brings transparency to financial markets, which means more competition, less price gouging 
of customers, and thus, lower windfall profits for bankers. In other words, this loophole would 
invite traders to artificially bring foreign currencies into other derivatives transactions in order to 
avoid the scrutiny of Dodd-Frank. During the Dodd-Frank debates, Senator Maria Cantwell 
stated, "I can't believe the first decision the administration would make to carry out Dodd-Frank 
would be an anti-transparency decision. The idea that the foreign-exchange markets are not at 
risk is preposterous. […] Anytime you have a lack of transparency, there is potential for abuse" 
(Kuttner). By contrast, the industry prefers no regulatory snooping and to have customized 
derivatives traded privately over the counter, where secrecy allows banks and their traders to 
book larger profits at the expense of customers. Creating another loophole for Wall Street could 
lead to an even bigger bailout in the future and could cause serious damage to the economy. 
It would be a calamity to allow FOREX traders around the world to continue to gamble 
with trillions of dollars in foreign exchange without strong regulations and oversight. For a 
market that exchanges $5.3 trillion every day it is unfathomable that FOREX was exempt from 
Title VII. Through the full implementation of Title VII on the FOREX market, traders would be 
required to fully report their activities and would be effectively prohibited from manipulating 
prices. Combined with more frequent reporting, the FOREX market may for once be kept in 
check. Should Title VII be enforced along with more frequent reporting I find it difficult for 
Wall Street to create a calamity out of the FOREX market. Although the implementation of 
Dodd-Frank to international companies allows U.S. regulators to review trading data on trades 
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between foreign firms, even if the U.S. has no interest in the transaction, it would still be difficult 
to enforce the regulation on foreign firms due to the need for global cooperation. Because Dodd-
Frank is only enforceable on U.S. institutions, simply reporting FOREX abuses to congress 
won’t be enough, as foreign governments would need to be involved in establishing both an 
international central clearing house and a standard reporting process. However, should the 
FOREX market continue down its current path of price manipulation and outright fraud it could 
“spell the end of unregulated foreign exchange markets” (Schäfer). Without regulation crises are 
bound to happen again and again and another wave of increasingly hefty fines will be handed 
out. While the balance sheets of the biggest FOREX players will be able to easily absorb 
exponentially larger fines, the damage inflicted by these scandals on investors’ confidence in fair 
and transparent markets may be longer lasting. Until further regulation is imposed on the 
FOREX market, only through fining and firing perpetrators will companies begin to learn that 
their actions are unlawful. It is an unfortunate reality, because when you do things right people 
won’t believe you’ve done anything at all.  
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